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Constitutional Law
Congress’s Power Over Military Offices
Zachary S. Price1
Introduction
Congress’s power to structure administrative agencies and
executive offices is an important constraint on modern presidents.
In particular, by vesting authorities in subordinate offices rather
than the presidency, Congress may place friction between
presidential desires and policy outcomes, even when the officer in
question is subject to at-will removal. Doing so may help maintain
agency adherence to legal requirements, ensure fidelity to agency
statutory missions, and enable political enforcement of norms and
conventions regarding appropriate conduct. As one example
illustrating this power’s significance, President Donald Trump did
not fire the special prosecutor investigating his presidential
campaign because the power to fire belonged to the Attorney
General (or Acting Attorney General), not the President.
Although scholars of administrative law have long recognized
the importance of this congressional power and debated its proper
contours, parallel questions regarding military offices have
received insufficient attention. Even scholars who take broad
views of congressional authority in the administrative context
have typically assumed that the President, as Commander in
Chief, must have plenary authority over military functions. For its
part, the executive branch, in legal opinions, signing statements,
and other documents across multiple administrations, has asserted
remarkably broad theories of presidential command authority.
Based on its asserted view that “[i]t is for the President alone, as
Commander-in-Chief, to make the choice of the particular
personnel who are to exercise operational and tactical command
functions over the U.S. Armed Forces,”2 the executive branch has
claimed authority to ignore statutory limits on who may command
1

Excerpted and adapted from Zachary S. Price, Congress’s Power Over
Military Offices, 99 TEX. L. REV. 491 (2021).
2
Placing of U.S. Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or
Tactical Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 185 (1996).
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U.S. forces in combat and even on how many soldiers or sailors
must compose units.
This pro-presidential consensus is mistaken. It is true that the
President, as Commander in Chief, has some directive authority
over U.S. military forces in the field, and military officers hold a
duty to obey lawful presidential commands. But Congress retains
the power to structure the offices, chains of command, and
disciplinary mechanisms through which the President’s authority
is exercised. Just as in the administrative context, Congress may
vest powers and duties—authority to launch nuclear weapons or a
cyber operation, for example, or command over units—in
specified offices, even regarding the use of force. Further,
although the Constitution gives presidents removal authority over
these officers as a default means of command discipline, Congress
may to some degree supplant or limit this authority by replacing it
with alternative disciplinary mechanisms, such as criminal
penalties for disobeying lawful orders. By defining duties,
command relationships, and disciplinary mechanisms in this way,
Congress may establish structures of accountability that promote
key values, protect military professionalism, and even encourage
or discourage particular results, all without infringing upon the
President’s ultimate authority to direct the nation’s armed forces.
These conclusions, though perhaps at odds with modern
intuitions about the President’s Commander-in-Chief power,
accord with both the Constitution’s plain text and the broad
contours of actual practice over the past 150 years. To demonstrate
this point, this chapter first discusses the text and history
supporting congressional authority to assign military duties by
statute and then turns to support for limiting presidential power to
terminate military officers at will.
Congress’s Power to Structure the Military
by Assigning Duties to Particular Offices
The constitutional text and historical practice support
inferring broad congressional authority to structure the military by
assigning duties to particular offices.
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A. Support from Constitutional Text and Structure
Although Article II makes the President “Commander in
Chief,” Article I gives Congress the power to “declare War,”
“raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” and
provide for calling the state militias into federal service. It also
empowers Congress to “make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” More generally, the
Constitution’s Appointments Clause provides that “Officers of the
United States” must be appointed by the President with Senate
advice and consent, unless Congress provides by law for
appointment of an “inferior Officer” by the President alone, a
department head, or federal court. In addition, Congress holds
overall authority to structure the executive branch by virtue of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers it to pass
legislation necessary and proper to carrying into execution “all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States or in any department or officer thereof.”
With respect to powers vested in civil and administrative
offices, the prevailing scholarly view is that the President is
ultimately an “overseer” and not a “decider.”3 In other words,
although the President may oversee how officers discharge their
duties, and perhaps remove them from office for unsatisfactory
performance, authorities vested in an officer by statute ultimately
belong to that officer, not the President. On this view, Congress
holds authority not only to create offices as the Appointments
Clause contemplates, but also, in conjunction with the Necessary
and Proper Clause, to vest those offices with functions and duties
that then belong to the individual officer, not the President.
With respect to the military, the executive branch has
repeatedly asserted that Congress has no power to set military
duties. “As commander-in-chief of the army it is your right to
decide according to your own judgment what officer shall perform
any particular duty,” Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black wrote to

3

Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
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President James Buchanan in 1860,4 and later presidents have
nodded in agreement.5 Commentators have largely agreed.6
4

Mem. of Capt. Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468 (1860).
See, e.g., Legal Auth. Supporting the Activities of the Nat’l Sec.
Agency Described by the President, 30 Op. O.L.C. 1, 37–38 (2006)
(“[A]n act of Congress, if intended to constrain the President’s discretion
in assigning duties to an officer in the army, would be
unconstitutional.”); Stmt. on Signing the Nat’l Defense Auth. Act for
Fiscal Year 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 226 (Feb. 10, 1996) (“[T]he Congress
deleted the restriction on the President’s authority to make and
implement decisions relating to the operational or tactical control of
elements of the U.S. armed forces, a restriction which clearly infringed
on the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.”);
Placing of U.S. Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or
Tactical Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 184 (1996) (“Whatever the scope
of this authority in other contexts, there can be no room to doubt that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause commits to the President alone the power
to select the particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and
operational control over U.S. forces.”); Training of British Flying
Students in the U.S., 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 61–62 (1941) (observing that
the President’s “authority” as Commander in Chief “undoubtedly
includes the power to dispose of troops and equipment in such manner
and on such duties as best to promote the safety of the country”).
6
See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 769 (2008) (“[T]he text, as
reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least some
variant of a ‘unitary executive’ within the armed forces, particularly as
to traditional functions in armed conflicts.”); Strauss, supra note 3, at
738 (“Unlike army generals, who may be commanded, the heads of
departments the President appoints and the Senate confirms have the
responsibility to decide the issues Congress has committed to their
care—after appropriate consultation, to be sure—and not simply to
obey.”); John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2280
(2009) (“Even if inferior officers refused to carry out presidential orders,
the Commander-in-Chief Clause would seem to include the power to
promote or demote officers and to make duty assignments.”); cf.
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and
Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 384 (2008) (arguing that
Congress “cannot create independent military officers or agencies, it
cannot force the Commander in Chief to use officers that lack his
confidence, and it cannot require the Commander in Chief to consult
others prior to exercising his constitutional powers”).
5
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Yet the textual arguments for congressional power to assign
military duties are at least as strong. The language governing
office-holding in the Appointments Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause makes no distinction between military and
nonmilitary offices. And even if one doubted Congress’s power to
allocate statutory authorities among civil and administrative
officers, Congress’s specific constitutional powers over the
military strengthen the inference of congressional power in that
context. Congress, again, holds specific constitutional authority to
“raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” and
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces.” Assigning duties and responsibilities within the
military chain of command may be a potent means of governing
and regulating the military, and a provision assigning some
responsibility or command to a particular office can readily be
described as a “Rule[]” regarding the military’s “Government,” if
not also its “Regulation.” The Supreme Court has confirmed the
breadth of Congress’s authority: “It is clear that the Constitution
contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control
over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the
Military Establishment . . . .”7
Perhaps the Commander-in-Chief Clause’s language suggests
a stronger directive power with respect to the military than the
Take Care Clause provides for the civil service. The Take Care
Clause, after all, obligates the President only to “take Care” that
the laws are executed faithfully, whereas being “Commander”
implies some power to issue affirmative commands. But with
respect to whether Congress may assign duties by statute, the
provisions are indistinct: both suggest that primary government
power will be exercised by others. In other words, just as the
obligation to ensure faithful execution implies that someone else
besides the President does the executing, serving as commander
implies having something to command. The framers at the
Philadelphia Convention debated whether the President should
even be allowed to exercise direct command over troops in the
field. Although President Washington did so during an uprising in
western Pennsylvania known as the Whiskey Rebellion, the norm
across American history has been to command troops only
indirectly, through orders to subordinate commanders in the field.
7

Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
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This practice reinforces the institutional separation between
presidential command and actual military activity that the text
itself implies.
B. Historical Practice in Statutes and Executive Behavior
As for government practice, statutes today regulate military
offices with respect to everything from appointments and
promotions to duties, assignments, removals, and other forms of
discipline, often to a degree well beyond the norm for civil and
administrative officers.
Historically, Congress has repeatedly exercised broad
authority to structure the military by defining the duties of offices
and the command relationships between them. Some of the
earliest military-organization statutes specified the authorities that
senior officers held. One early statute, for example, transferred
navy-related authorities from the previously created office of
Secretary of War to the newly created position of Secretary of the
Navy, making clear that the Secretary of War could no longer
exercise them. This statute’s sharp division between Army and
Navy commands persisted, with only limited interruptions, and
with important institutional consequences, until 1947.
Some of those early statutes specifying officer authorities also
specified that they would be exercised according to presidential
direction. Although specifications for presidential control might
be understood to endorse a broad view of presidential control over
military functions, the very specification of presidential directive
power more naturally implies congressional authority to withhold
or modify, or at least regulate, such power if Congress so desires.
Other statutes vested duties in subordinate offices. In 1813,
for example, Congress assigned duties relating to military supplies
to a “superintendent general of military supplies,” appointed by
the President with Senate approval, who would act “under the
direction of the Secretary for the War department.” The executive
branch seems to have accepted this congressional power to
structure the military by defining officers’ duties. In 1820, the
Attorney General concluded that although the President generally
“may suspend, modify, or rescind, at pleasure, any order issued by
the lieutenant-colonel of the marine corps, or any other
subordinate officer,” that presidential authority was limited
“where a direct authority has been given by Congress to an officer
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to perform any particular function—for example, for a
commanding officer to order courts-martial in certain cases.”8
During the Mexican-American War, President James K. Polk
complained in his diary that he could not give any general in
whom he had confidence overall command of military forces
because doing so would be at odds with statutes specifying
military-command relationships. During the Civil War, although
President Lincoln claimed authority to allocate command
responsibilities to individual military officers, he abided by
statutes conferring particular duties on particular offices.
After the Civil War, Congress went further by vesting
Reconstruction-governance authority in specified military officers
and requiring that all Army orders go through a top general who
was protected from at-will removal. As a practical matter, these
statutory directives not only structured command relationships but
also encouraged policy outcomes; they came close to stripping the
President’s command authority altogether. Although Congress
has not gone so far since, these aggressive statutes could indicate
a latent power to define military relationships in ways that sharply
limit presidential control.
Half a century later, the United States’ rise to global
preeminence prompted a renewed set of congressional debates
over military organization. During World War I, the so-called
Overman Act gave the President just the sort of command
flexibility that modern presidents have claimed as a matter of
constitutional right. But Congress repealed this authority after the
war, despite an executive-branch proposal to retain similar
executive flexibility. During World War II, Congress renewed the
Overman Act’s key provisions, once again conferring broad
authority to structure military-command relationships, but once
again only for the duration of the war.
After World War II, Congress consolidated the War and Navy
Departments by placing them within the newly created
Department of Defense (initially called the National Military
Establishment) in the National Security Act of 1947. This statute
also created the Air Force as a distinct service; established
separate Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with
authority over their respective services, subject to the general
8

Power of the Sec’y of the Navy Over the Marine Corps, 1 Op. Att’y
Gen. 380, 381 (1820).
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direction of the Secretary of Defense; and authorized the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (developed during World War II and codified in
this Act) to establish unified commands among services. At the
same time, the Act imposed multiple impediments to direct
presidential control over the services.
Then in the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress, building on some
intervening amendments to the 1947 Act, authorized the
President, “through the Secretary of Defense,” to establish
“combatant commands” with authority over forces in different
regions. Under the Act, military commanders drawn from the
different services exercise command authority over specified
units, which may also be drawn from multiple different services.
The legislation’s entire purpose was to break down prior
command relationships and replace them with new ones better
suited (Congress hoped) to achieving the nation’s military and
foreign-policy objectives. Neither this statute nor the protracted
political struggle necessary to enact it would have made sense if
Congress lacked power to define and allocate duties and
authorities within the military. Thus, the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
like the many statutes proceeding it, reflects broad congressional
authority to organize the military by assigning duties to particular
offices, even at the expense of the President’s ability to achieve
desired objectives.
Congress’s Power to Limit Removal of Military Officers
The constitutional text and history also support congressional
authority to limit removal of military officers, as long as Congress
provides robust alternative means of command discipline to the
President and other officers in the chain of command.
Under current statutes, although presidents and others in the
chain of command often have authority to relieve an officer of
certain duties, such as command of a ship or unit, they do not have
authority in peacetime to unilaterally remove an officer from the
service altogether. These statutes give effect to the President’s
authority as Commander in Chief by providing for court martial
or other discipline of officers who disobey lawful commands, but,
at the same time, the statutes protect military careers and officers’
professionalism by preventing peacetime termination without
cause. Nothing in the constitutional text or structure suggests that
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such limitations on removal are invalid when the President’s
command authority can be fulfilled through effective alternative
forms of discipline.
As for historical practice, Congress has generally barred
peacetime removals without cause since 1866,9 and both the
executive branch and the courts appear to have accepted these
laws’ validity.10 This longstanding practice, combined with the
textual inference that the President may remain Commander in
Chief despite lacking removal authority, suggests that Congress
could go still further and impose similar limitations even during
wartime.
Implications for Current Proposals and Controversies
Congress’s broad authority over military offices carries
important implications for current disputes. In recent years, the
Secretary of Defense apparently withdrew military forces from
certain domestic-security functions against the President’s wishes,
the Navy Secretary resigned rather than accept presidential
interference with planned discipline for a wayward Navy SEAL,
controversy erupted over an aggressive military strike against a
senior Iranian officer in Iraq, and Congress created a new “Space
Force” within the Department of the Air Force. In addition, one
recent statute vested authority over certain offensive cyber
operations jointly in the President and Secretary of Defense, rather
than the President alone. Another statute conditioned force
withdrawals from South Korea on certifications by the Secretary,
though President Trump declared this provision unconstitutional
in a signing statement. Advocates have called for statutory limits
on presidential discretion over nuclear weapons, among other
things. The validity of all these actions and proposals depends on
the relative extent of congressional and presidential authority to
define military officers’ duties and their degree of independence
from presidential dictates. Under a correct understanding of
9

See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (“No commissioned officer may be
dismissed from any armed force except (1) by sentence of a general
court-martial; (2) in commutation of a sentence of a general courtmartial; or (3) in time of war, by order of the President.”).
10
See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886); Boatswain in
Navy—Revocation of Warrant, 28 Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 328 (1910).
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congressional and presidential powers over military offices,
statutes assigning duties to positions and limiting at-will removal
should be binding on presidents, even with respect to operational
military functions.
These conclusions also inform broader separation-of-powers
debates. For example, the Supreme Court recently suggested in
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that
“[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone”
and that subordinate officers therefore “wield” authorities
belonging to the President.11 But this view is wrong even for the
military, let alone civil administration. Congress’s extensive
authority to allocate military duties should put to rest the strongest
versions of the so-called unitary-executive-branch theory, under
which all power vested in executive offices is thought to be
necessarily vested in the President as well. Similarly, the
longstanding career protections for military officers—requiring a
court martial or other due process before any peacetime
removal—reinforce the constitutional validity of parallel career
protections for the civil service, even if the Supreme Court
concludes that a broader range of positions qualify as “offices”
under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.
Conclusion
Disputes about congressional and presidential authority over
the military are unlikely to fade away. As long as our politics
remain erratic, conflicted, and polarized, Congress is likely to
assert power to structure the military, while presidents will push
back with aggressive theories of the Commander-in-Chief power.
Yet our Constitution’s text and structure, read in light of
longstanding practice, support broad congressional authority to
allocate military duties and authorities to offices other than the
President. Although the President as Commander in Chief holds
constitutional authority to direct how such functions are
discharged, Congress can preclude the President himself from
performing those functions and instead allocate them to another
officer. Congress likewise can replace the President’s default
removal authority with other sufficiently robust mechanisms of

11

40 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).

Vol. 6

The Judges’ Book

33

disciplinary control, such as criminal punishment for disobedience
through courts martial.
Congress, in short, holds broad authority to structure the
United States’ military apparatus by statute, allocating duties and
authorities as it deems best and crafting appropriate mechanisms
of disciplinary control, despite the Constitution’s commitment of
Commander-in-Chief power to the President.
*

*

*
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